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DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1980
Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l in
1966 to provide the public with a procedure for obtaining agency
records. In its fourteen-year history the FOIA has been amended four
times,2 and its provisions have been construed in almost one thousand
decisions.3 More than 130 decisions, including four by the Supreme
Court, analyzed issues under the FOIA in 1980. In addition, Congress
in 1980 amended a statute regulating information disclosure4 that is
incorporated by reference into the FOIA under Exemption 3. 5 To-
gether, these developments show a trend toward restricting disclosure
under the Act despite the Act's purpose to "establish a general philoso-
phy of full agency disclosure."' 6
I. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) (as amended).
2. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, tit. 9, § 906(a)(10), 92 Stat. 1225;
Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976); Act of Nov. 21,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64; Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81
Stat. 54.
In addition, Congress continues to recommend changes. Representative Preyer introduced
two bills in 1980 that would further amend the FOIA. See H.R. 7055, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)
(adding a new exemption for materials classified by the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency); H.R. 7056, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (creating a new exemption for information ob-
tained by the CIA under an express promise of confidentiality). Representative Quayle intro-
duced a bill in March of 1980 that would expand the definition of an agency under the FOIA to
include "any authority of the Congress." See H.R. 6870, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See gener-
ally note 27 infra. The first of these bills received a May, 1980 hearing in the House. No action
has been taken on either the second or the third.
3. For discussion of developments under the FOIA in prior years, see Comment, Develop-
ments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1979, 1980 DUKE L.J. 139; Note, Developments
Under the Freedom of Information Act-1978, 1979 DUKE L.J. 327; Note, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1977, 1978 DUKE L.J. 189; Note, Developments Under the Freedom
of Information Act-1976, 1977 Duke L.J. 532; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information
Act-1974, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of lnformation Act-
1973, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1972,
1973 DUKE L.J. 178; Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE L.J.
115, 136; Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1970, 1971 DUKE L.J. 149, 164; Pro-
ject, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DUKE L.J. 67, 72.
4. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-77 (West Supp. 1981)). See notes 177-97 infra and accompanying
text.
5. Exemption 3 provides that FOIA disclosure obligations do not apply to matters that are
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
6. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprintedin SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFOR-
1980 FOL4 DEVELOPMENTS
This comment analyzes the more significant developments under
the FOIA in 1980. Part I examines three Supreme Court decisions that
discuss the threshold requirement in a requester's suit to compel disclo-
sure under the FOIA: improper withholding of agency records. In Kis-
singer v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press7 the Court
defined the elements of a FOIA suit8 and narrowly construed the
"withholding" criterion to preclude disclosure of documents removed
from an agency.9 The decision in Forsham v. Harris,10 in conjunction
with Kissinger, requires that an agency have created or obtained the
requested documents before they will be accorded "agency records"
status; mere possession without control is insufficient to confer such sta-
tus. 11 Records withheld under the authority of a permanent injunction
in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.12
were deemed properly withheld under the Act.13
The comment then in Part II discusses cases construing Exemption
1 of the FOIA, the national-security provision.14 These cases consider
which of two executive orders should control an agency's classification
of confidential documents and whether an agency may reassess its clas-
sification after a FOIA request. Cases interpreting federal statutes fall-
ing within the scope of Exemption 3-which provides for nondisclosure
based on a withholding statute-I 5 are discussed in Part 111.16 In the
major Exemption 3 case of 1980, Consumer Product Safety Commission
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,17 the Supreme Court held that provisions of the
Consumer Product Safety Act'8 protecting manufacturers from the in-
accurate publication of submitted information apply both to agency
-initiated disclosures and to requests made under the FOIA. 19 Part III
also examines the new congressional enactment that restricts the disclo-
MATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38
(1974) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK].
7. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
8. See notes 25-55 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 56-72 infra and accompanying text.
10. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
11. See notes 89-119 infra and accompanying text.
12. 445 U.S. 375 (1980).
13. See notes 73-88 infra and accompanying text.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). See notes 120-49 infra and accompanying text. The obliga-
tion to disclose attaches only if the request reasonably identifies the requested records. Krohn v.
Department of Justice, 628 F.2d 195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (1976).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
16. See notes 150-213 infra and accompanying text.
17. 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976).
19. See notes 155-76 infra and accompanying text.
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sure of information by the Federal Trade Commission.20
Next, Part IV discusses a recent interpretation of the intra-agency
memorandum exemption.2' This interpretation requires the disclosure
of numerous legal memoranda used by the Internal Revenue Service. 22
Finally, Part V analyzes one case construing Exemption 7(A), which
concerns investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
the disclosure of which would interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings.23 In Moorefeld v. United States Secret Service24 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit extended the concept of "enforcement
proceeding" to include more than adjudicatory proceedings and cre-
ated a blanket exemption for active Secret Service files.
I. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS: IMPROPER WITHHOLDING OF
AGENCY RECORDS
The FOIA makes available to "any" person25 all agency records
except those that fall within one or more of the nine statutory exemp-
tions.26 If an agency27 denies a request for documents and the denial is
upheld on administrative appeal,28 the requesting party may sue in fed-
eral district court for an injunction against withholding the requested
records and for an order compelling the production of records wrong-
fully withheld.29 As an incentive to information requesters, the Act
specifically provides for the assessment of attorney's fees and litigation
20. See notes 177-97 infra and accompanying text.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
22. See notes 214-49 infra and accompanying text.
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976). See notes 250-66 infra and accompanying text.
24. 611 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cerl denied, 101 S. Ct. 283 (1980).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). For further discussion of parties qualifying under this provi-
sion, see 1 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE
LAW §§ 5.04, 8.07 (1980). Butsee Doyle v. Department of Justice, 494 F. Supp. 842 (D.D.C. 1980)
(a fugitive from justice is ineligible).
26. The FOIA exemptions are set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
27. Section 552(e) of the FOIA, id § 552(e), defines "agency" as follows: "[Tihe term
'agency' as defined in section 55 l(l) of this title includes any executive department, military de-
partment, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment
in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or
any independent regulatory agency." See note 90 infra. Cf. Warth v. Department of Justice, 595
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1979) (a trial transcript possessed by the Department of Justice is a court docu-
ment and not a disclosable agency record); Valenti v. Department of Justice, 503 F. Supp. 230
(E.D. La. 1980) (a grand jury transcript possessed by the Justice Department pursuant to FED. R.
CQM. P. 6(e) is a court record to which the FOIA is inapplicable).
28. A requester must exhaust his administrative remedies before instituting suit. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 20.01 (1976).
29. "mhe district court. . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld... ..." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
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costs against the United States30 whenever a complainant substantially
prevails in a suit to compel disclosure of improperly withheld records.3'
The FOIA's grant to district courts of "jurisdiction to enjoin [an]
agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of
any agency records improperly withheld" 32 was the subject of Supreme
Court litigation in 1980. Kissinger v. Reporters Commillee for Freedom
of the Press33 involved FOIA requests seeking transcripts and summa-
ries of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations that occurred during
his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and as Secretary of State. Early in 1976 New York Times columnist
William Safire filed a FOIA request with the Department of State seek-
ing transcripts of Dr. Kissinger's telephone conversations occurring
while he served as Assistant to the President for National Security Af-
30. Id § 552(a)(4)(E). A prevailing requester can recover the attorney's fees he incurs in an
action to recover fees as well as those incurred in the substantive suit. See Education-Instruccion,
Inc. v. HUD, 87 F.R.D. 112 (D. Mass. 1980).
There is a split among the courts of appeals about whether plaintiffs proceeding pro se are
eligible for attorney's fees where there are no out-of-pocket legal expenses. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has consistently upheld awards of attorney's fees to plaintiffs
representing themselves. See, e.g., Crooker v. Department of Treasury, No. 80-1412 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 23, 1980) (per curiam); Cox v. Department of Justice, 601 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C. 1976), afd sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d
160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). One district court decision in the First Circuit followed this view, see
Marschner v. Department of State, 470 F. Supp. 196 (D. Conn. 1979), but the most recent decision
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagrees. Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632
F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1980). Accord, Crooker v. Department of Treasury, 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980);
Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Burke v. Department of
Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1976), ajfdmem, 559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977).
Two courts considering the novel question whether interim attorney's fees could be awarded
reached opposite conclusions. The court in Biberman v. FBI, 496 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
held that the FOIA authorizes an interim fee award but "only in those cases in which it is neces-
sary to the continuance of litigation which has proven to be meritorious at the time of the applica-
tion." Id at 265. In contrast, the District Court for the District of Columbia denied interim
attorney's fees in Letelier v. Department of Justice, 1 Gov'T DISCLOSURE SERV. (P-H) 1 80,252
(D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1980), though it noted that a final court order is not a prerequisite for a "substan-
tially" prevailing complainant to recover fees. Id
Even if a judgment for attorney's fees is granted, a district court may not tax interest against
the government as well. Holly v. Chasen, 639 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
31. Whether a plaintiff has substantially prevailed is not always clear. See, e.g., Braintree
Elec. Light Dep't v. Department of Energy, 494 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1980) (compelled produc-
tion of only customer names out of 23 requested documents did not satisfy the "substantially
prevailed" standard); Hamlin v. Kelly, No. 79-3902 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 1980) (even though more
documents were withheld than were disclosed under the court's order, the sizeable number of
documents unjustifiably excised warranted the award of attorney's fees). See generally Note, De-
velopments Under FOIA-1977, supra note 3, at 199-203.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976), set out in part in note 29 supra. The legislative history of
the FOIA indicates that this section "contains a specific court remedy for any alleged wrongful
withholding of agency records by agency personnel." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 8
(1965), reprinted in SOURCE Booic, supra note 6, at 43.
33. 445 US. 136 (1980).
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fairs. 34 The Department denied Safire's request, claiming that the tran-
scripts were not agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA.
Later in 1976 Kissinger removed all telephone conversation transcripts
then in his State Department files and donated them to the Library of
Congress by a deed that limited public access to the documents. 35
After Kissinger had donated the notes to the Library of Congress,
the Military Audit Project (MAP) and the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press (RCFP) filed two similar FOIA requests with the
State Department. The MAP and RCFP sought disclosure of tele-
phone conversation transcripts made while Kissinger was both Na-
tional Security Adviser and Secretary of State.36 These requests were
denied on the grounds that, first, the notes were not agency records
and, second, the State Department's custody and control had termi-
nated when the notes were deposited with the Library, thus relieving
the Department of its disclosure obligations. The Safire, MAP, and
RCFP denials were all upheld on administrative appeal3 7 and the re-
questers brought suit under the FOIA to compel disclosure. 38
The district court ordered the Library of Congress to return to the
State Department those transcripts prepared while Kissinger was Secre-
tary of State, finding that these transcripts were agency records subject
to disclosure and that Kissinger's removal of the records without prior
permission was wrongful.39 The court did not, however, order disclo-
sure of the notes prepared while Dr. Kissinger was National Security
Adviser.40 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
34. Safire requested those transcripts in which his name appeared or in which Kissinger dis-
cussed information leaks from the White House. Id at 143.
35. Public access to the telephone notes would not begin until 25 years after the transfer or
five years after Kissinger's death, whichever came later, and then only with the consent of the
other parties to the conversation, or upon their deaths. Until that time, access was limited to
members of the Library staffjointly approved by Dr. Kissinger and the Library, and those receiv-
ing permission from a committee to be established in his will. Id at 141-42.
36. Dr. Kissinger served as National Security Adviser from 1968 to 1975 and as Secretary of
State from 1973 to 1977. From 1973 to 1975 he held both positions.
37. 445 U.S. at 143-44.
38. The suits were consolidated in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See Re-
porters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Vance, No. 77-220, and Military Audit Project v.
Department of State, No. 77-391, 442 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1977), ajfdmem., 589 F.2d 1116 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), aft'd in part andrev'd inpart sub nom. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
39. Although the district court found that the Library of Congress is not an agency under the
FOIA, the court relied on its inherent equitable powers as authority to order the Library to return
the documents. See 442 F. Supp. at 385-86.
40. The district court denied the requests for notes made while Kissinger was National Secur-
ity Adviser on the assumption that the plaintiffs had withdrawn their challenge to Kissinger's
defense that the White House documents are not "agency records." See 442 F. Supp. at 386. This
assumption was incorrect. See 445 U.S. at 145. The court of appeals therefore affirmed this part
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summarily affirmed the order 4l and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.42
The Supreme Court first considered whether federal courts had
jurisdiction to provide the requested relief. After ruling that neither the
Federal Records Act 43 nor the Federal Records Disposal Act44 con-
ferred authority to grant relief,45 the Court reviewed the jurisdictional
section of the FOIA.46 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, con-
cluded the courts may "devise remedies and enjoin agencies" 47 only if
an agency has "(1) 'improperly' (2) 'withheld' (3) 'agency records.' ",48
The Court rejected Safire's request, which was limited to transcripts
and notes accumulated while Kissinger was National Security Adviser,
because these documents were not "agency records. '4 9 It rejected the
MAP and RCFP requests, made after Kissinger removed the materials
of the decision on a different theory: that the notes were not agency records. See Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Vance, a'd mem., 589 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming
without opinion), a'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 145-46.
41. 589 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1978), aj'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Kissinger v. Re-
porters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
42. 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
43. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2909, 3101-3107 (1976). The Federal Records Act authorizes federal
agency heads to establish and administer records management programs, which require retention
of documentation of program policies and procedures. Id § 3101; see 445 U.S. at 147. Agency
heads are authorized to initiate actions through the Attorney General to recover records unlaw-
fully removed from an agency. 44 U.S.C. § 3106 (1976).
44. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3324 (1976 and Supp. 111978). This Act provides that agency records,
as defined by section 3301, may not be alienated or destroyed without the consent of the Adminis-
trator of General Services. Id § 3303a; see 445 U.S. at 147.
45. The petitioners contended that the Federal Records Act and the Federal Records Dis-
posal Act conferred a private right of action to compel the Library of Congress to transfer the
requested documents back to the State Department. The Court, after carefully analyzing the lan-
guage of the statutes and their legislative histories, refused to recognize such an implied right of
action. 445 U.S. at 147-50. See also American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 494 F. Supp. 803
(D.D.C. 1980) (Kissinger does not preclude a suit by private plaintiffs for violations of agencies'
statutory responsibilities); American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 485 F. Supp. 222 (D.D.C.
1980) (jurisdiction exists under the Administrative Procedure Act for private plaintiffs to obtain a
preliminary injunction forbidding a proposed agency destruction of documents and ordering the
FBI to formulate a retention plan as required by statute).
The Kissinger Court concluded that only the Attorney General, at the request of an agency
official, may sue to recover improperly removed records. 445 U.S. at 148. Two bills introduced in
Congress in 1980 would change this result. See H.R. 8029, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (introduced
by Rep. Weiss) (this bill would allow private citizens to sue in similar circumstances); H.R. 7627,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (introduced by Reps. Preyer and Weiss) (the bill would allow the
Archivist of the United States to recover wrongfully removed agency records).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976), set out in part in note 29 supra.
47. 445 U.S. at 150.
48. Id. The Court stated: "Judicial authority to devise remedies and enjoin agencies can
only be invoked, under the jurisdictional grant conferred by § 552, if the agency has contravened
all three components of this obligation." Id
49. See notes 93-101 infra and accompanying text.
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from the State Department, on the ground that the documents had not
been "withheld. '50
Although it does not expressly add any requirements to the statute,
the Court's reading of the jurisdictional provision requires FOIA re-
questers to establish, as a threshold element of the litigation, that the
requested documents satisfy each of the three criteria.5' Failure to
meet any one of them deprives courts of their power to grant a remedy
under the FOIA. Both the FOIA and its legislative history state that
the agency has the burden of proving that its withholding is justified.52
The Kissinger Court's requirement of "a showing" that the three crite-
ria have been met53 indicates that a plaintiff under the FOIA must
demonstrate that "agency records" were "improperly" "withheld"-a
considerable obstacle-before the burden of proof is imposed on the
agency. Moreover, the plaintiff's difficulty is not lessened by amor-
phous definitions of the criteria54 and the fact that discovery is occa-
50. See notes 56-72 infra and accompanying text. Despite his victory in the Supreme Court,
Kissinger later agreed to release a number of the telephone summaries that did not contain purely
personal information. Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1980, § A, at 12, col. 1.
51. 445 U.S. at 150. Whether the Court's interpretation of section 552(a)(4)(B) is directed to
the necessary elements of a suit under the FOIA or to the requirements of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion is not clear. See id at 139, 150, 155; id at 161 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Although there may be a technical difference between the two notions, the absence of
any substantial difference may have accounted for the Court's avoidance of a clear-cut distinction.
52. "[Ihe burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). The
Senate Judiciary Committee report on S. 1160, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965), the bill that was later
codified into the FOIA, states:
Placing the burden of proof upon the agency puts the task of justifying the with-
holding on the only party able to explain it. The private party can hardly be asked to
prove that an agency has improperly withheld public information because he will not
know the reasons for the agency action.
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1965), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 43.
Accord, Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 1980-1981 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,577, at 77,090 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(recognizing the plaintiff's "distinct disadvantage in attempting to test the claims alleged by the
agency").
53. 445 U.S. at 150.
54. Despite an opportunity to explain in clear terms the three FOIA criteria, the Supreme
Court in 1980 offered only minimal guidance. While the majority in Kissinger found that there is
no withholding without custody or control, 445 U.S. at 150-51, Justice Brennan's separate opinion
noted: "I am not without some uncertainty about the contours of the 'improper withholding'
standard." Id at 158 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, in
his separate opinion in Kissinger, offered clearer definitions of the criteria: "In my judgment, a
'withholding' occurs within the meaning of FOIA whenever an agency declines to produce agency
records it has a legal right to possess or control." Id at 162 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). With respect to the "improperly withholding" criterion, Justice Stevens stated:
"[Tihe answer to that question depends on the agency's explanation for its failure to attempt to
regain the documents. If the explanation is reasonable, then the withholding is not improper."
Id at 166.
Justice Brennan found equally unsatisfying the majority's decision in Forsham v. Harris, 445
U.S. 169, 182 (1980), "that an agency must first either create or obtain a record as a prerequisite to
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sionally limited in FOJA cases.55 Kissinger therefore accentuates the
plaintiff's burden of coming forward with evidence of the improper
withholding of agency records. The impact of this construction of the
statute becomes more evident in light of the judicial interpretations of
each criterion discussed in the following pages.
A. "Withholding'" Physical Possession versus Legal Custody or
Control
After determining that the FOLA authorizes relief only after a
showing that the agency improperly withheld records, the Kissinger
Court considered whether the agency receiving the request-the De-
partment of State-had withheld the documents that the MAP and
RCFP had requested. Noting that neither the FOLA nor its legislative
history defined the term "withholding," 56 the Court relied on a con-
gressional debate,57 an Attorney General's Memorandum, 58 cases inter-
preting the "agency records" requirement, 59 and the purposes of the
it becoming an 'agency record'...." He noted that "[t]he Court offers no manageable standards
of any kind." Id at 189 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's proposal for an "agency
records" standard is discussed in note 117 infra.
55. Discovery is generally available in FOIA cases, especially to determine the exact number
and nature of the agency's fies. See Slack v. FTC, 1980-1981 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,722 (D.
Mass. 1980) (discovery may be available to determine whether the requested documents are
agency records); 1 J. O'REILLY, supra note 25, §§ 8.03-.04. The recognition that FOIA litigation
primarily involves a question of law, and the existence of de novo review, has persuaded at least
some courts, however, that extensive discovery is unwarranted. See, e.g., Salkin v. Kurtz, No. 79-
C-3953 (N.D. IlL. Nov. 4, 1980) (denying plaintiff's requested interrogatives); Murphy v. FBI, 490
F. Supp. 1134 (D.D.C. 1980) (discovery is limited to purely factual issues; a question of fact can
arise only after the defendant has ified a responsive motion and accompanying affidavits); Lyle v.
IRS, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,867 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Long v. IRS, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,759
(W.D. Wash. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). See also Levine, Using the Freedom ofInformation Act as a.Disco very
Device, 36 Bus. LAW. 45 (1980); Comment, Developments Under FOI1-1979, supra note 3, at
159-61.
56. 445 U.S. at 151.
57. Representative Monagan described the FOIA as giving 'access to the informationpos-
sessed by [Government] servants." 112 CoNG. REc. 13,652 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Monagan),
quoted in 445 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added by the Court).
58. The Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act 23-24 (1967), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 194, 222-23,
quoted in 445 U.S. at 151, states that the FOIA "refers, of course, only to records in being and in
the possession or control of an agency. . . . [It] imposes no obligation to compile or procure a
record in response to a request."
59. "Most courts which have considered the question have concluded that the FOIA is only
directed at requiring agencies to disclose those 'agency records' for which they have chosen to
retain possession or controL" 445 U.S. at 151-52 & n.6. See, e.g., Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339,
346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47,48 (4th
Cir. 1973); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Nichols v.
United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 138 (D. Kan. 1971), ajt'don other grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (10th
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,Act60 in concluding that "withholding" occurs only if the agency has
custody of or control over the requested documents. An agency is not
"required to retrieve documents which have escaped its possession,
[and] which it has not endeavored to recover." 6' Although it refused to
define the "full contours of a prohibited 'withholding,' ",62 the Court
did decide that an agency does not withhold requested documents
when those documents were removed from the agency before the FOIA
request. 63 Because the State Department received the MAP and RCFP
requests only after Dr. Kissinger had removed the notes," the Court
held that the State Department did not have custody or control over the
documents 65 and therefore had not withheld them. Accordingly, these
claims were denied.66
Justices Brennan and Stevens separately concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. Although they agreed with the majority that "withhold-
ing" requires "custody or control, '67 they disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of those terms. The majority equated custody or control
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972). For further discussion of the "agency records" criterion,
see notes 89-119 infra and accompanying text.
60. See 445 U.S. at 152. The Court based its conclusion about the Act's purposes in part
upon the procedural aspects of a FOIA request and the limited amount of time the statute gives
agencies to respond to a request (10 days unless there are unusual circumstances, in which case a
10-day extension is permitted). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (1976). The Court concluded that "Con-
gress [did not expect] an agency to commence lawsuits in order to obtain possession of documents
requested .. " 445 U.S. at 153. In addition, the Court noted that the Act provides for agencies
to recover the direct costs of document search and duplication: "It is doubtful that Congress
intended that a 'search' include legal efforts to retrieve wrongfully removed documents ... " Id
at 154.
61. 445 U.S. at 152. According to a district court case decided after Kissinger, documents
located in the French headquarters of the International Police Organization (Interpol) and retriev-
able by the United States National Central Bureau of Interpol satisfy the "possession or control"
test of Kirsinger because the foreign depository can be considered an affiliate office. See Founding
Church of Scientology v. Miller, 490 F. Supp. 144, 150-51 (D.D.C. 1980). See also 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552(a)(6)(A), (B) (1976).
62. 445 U.S. at 150.
63. Id at 150. Similarly, there is no withholding when the requested documents have al-
ready been released pursuant to civil discovery in a different suit by the plaintiff against the same
agency. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. Customs Serv., No. 80-1149, slip op. at 7-8 & n.14 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 17, 1980).
64. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
65. 445 U.S. at 150-51. The Court noted that whether there has been a withholding must be
gauged by when the request was made, because there are no FOIA obligations before this time.
The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether this standard, which also governs requests
under the subpoena power, see Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147-48 (1935), might be
rejected if the document is intentionally removed from the agency or whether wrongful removal
after a request is filed constitutes a withholding. 445 U.S. at 155 n.9.
66. 445 U.S. at 154-55.
67. See id at 150-51 (majority opinion); id at 159 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); id at 161 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with physical possession.68 This interpretation exempts from FOIA
scrutiny those documents, such as those at issue in Kissinger, that have
been removed from agency files. Justice Stevens contended, however,
that the majority's interpretation was not mandated by the language of
the FOIA, was inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, and would
encourage outgoing agency officials to remove damaging information. 69
He proposed, instead, that an agency has custody or control over those
documents that it has the legal right to possess.70 In Justice Stevens's
view, failure to take steps to recover documents wrongfully removed
would constitute a withholding. 7' Because a withholding is a threshold
element of a suit under the FOIA, any interpretation of that require-
ment that shields true agency records from the public necessarily of-
fends the Act's objective of full disclosure.72 Justice Stevens recognized
the inadequacy of the majority's position and instead construed "with-
holding" to minimize potential mishandling and to maximize effective
disclosure.
B. "Improper" Withholding.
In GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc. ,73 the Supreme Court considered whether records possessed by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, which a court in another suit
had enjoined the Commission from disclosing, could be requested and
ordered disclosed under the FOIA. Consumers Union filed a FOIA
request with the Consumer Product Safety Commission seeking televi-
sion accident reports obtained by the Commission from several televi-
sion manufacturers under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).74
The Commission agreed to disclose the requested reports75 and notified
the manufacturers of the proposed disclosure. 76 Believing that the pro-
68. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. See also 445 U.S. at 164-66 & n.9 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. See 445 U.S. at 161 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id at 165. Relying on FOIA's purpose of providing public access to government records,
Justice Brennan perceived an obligation for agencies to retain possession of or control over agency
records. He therefore believed that the FOIA provides a means of recovering documents no
longer within agency control. Id at 159-60 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
71. Id at 165 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
73. 445 U.S. 375 (1980).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976).
75. The Commission determined that no FOIA exemption applied, but that in the public
interest it would disclose the requested documents even if one did.
76. The CPSA requires the Commission to notify manufacturers prior to disclosure. See 15
U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976), set out in note 156 infra.
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posed disclosure would violate the CPSA, 77 the manufacturers ob-
tained temporary restraining orders78 and later a permanent
injunction 79 enjoining the Commission from disclosing the material.
Consumers Union then filed suit to enforce its FOIA request.80
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Commission,
by obeying the injunction prohibiting disclosure of the requested docu-
ments, was "improperly" withholding the documents.8' A unanimous
Court held that there was not an improper withholding and that the
requesters were therefore not entitled to relief.8 2
The Court was confident that the purpose of the FOIA was to pre-
vent "the unjustified suppression of information by agency officials. ' 83
This conclusion was supported by a Senate Report's interchangeable
use of "improperly" and "wrongfully. ' 84 In Consumers Union the pres-
ence of the permanent injunction precluded the agency from exercising
any discretion over whether to release the documents; thus the tradi-
tional FOIA concerns were inapplicable. The agency was "required to
obey the injunctions out of 'respect for judicial process.' ",85 Its actions
were therefore not improper.86 In the absence of any express provision
in the FOIA or its legislative history, the Court found no basis for re-
77. The manufacturers argued that section 2055(b)(1) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1)
(1976), proscribed the release of the information from which a manufacturer's identity could be
determined if that information was inaccurate or the disclosure would be otherwise unfair. They
claimed that the information scheduled for disclosure contained misleading and inaccurate state-
ments, which are prohibited by section 2055(b)(1).
78. The temporary restraining orders are discussed in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352, 358 & n.4 (D. Del. 1975) (granting a preliminary injunction).
79. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977)
(permanent injunction granted), aff'd, 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1979), af'd, 447 U.S. 102 (1980),
discussed in notes 150-76 infra and accompanying text.
80. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 400 F.
Supp. 848 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 561 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub non.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 434 U.S. 1030 (1978), earlier
judgment aff'd sub nonL Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'dsub non. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union
of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980).
81. 445 U.S. at 384.
82. Id at 387.
83. Id at 385.
84. Id at 386 (citing S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5, 8 (1965)).
85. 445 U.S. at 386-87.
86. "To construe the lawful obedience of an injunction issued by a federal district court with
jurisdiction to enter such a decree as 'improperly' withholding documents under the [FOIA]...
would extend the Act well beyond the intent of Congress." d at 387.
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quiring the Commission to commit contempt of court in order to satisfy
the FOIA requests.87
Consumers Union clearly exempts agencies from FOIA disclosure
when they have been enjoined from releasing the documents. The
holding is a narrow one, however, and given the necessity of establish-
ing that an agency's withholding was improper, the importance of Con-
sumers Union may be its silence about what other withholdings would
be improper.88
C. ' 4gency Records."
The FOIA authorizes courts to order the disclosure only of im-
properly withheld "agency records."8 9 Although the Act defines the
term "agency," 90 neither the Act nor its legislative history contains a
definition of "agency records." 9' In contrast to the "withholding" and
"improperly" criteria for FOIA applicability, the agency-record re-
87. This position is analogous to the decision in Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1980); in neither case did the Court require the agency to go out
of its way to make documents available to the requesters.
88. Other than in cases factually identical to Consumers Union, there is no standard for deter-
mining when agencies are acting improperly under the FOIA. Furthermore, only Kissinger and
Consumers Union have attempted to construe the "improperly" criterion beyond the case in which
an agency with full possession and control withholds information under authority of one of the
statutory exemptions. Justice Stevens, writing separately in Kissinger, would predicate a finding
that a withholding is "improper" on whether an agency's explanation of why it had failed to
produce the documents was reasonable. 445 U.S. at 166-67 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). This position encompasses the decision in Consumers Union, is consistent with
the presently accepted view that an agency does not improperly withhold information that is
shielded by one of the Act's exemptions, and provides courts and litigants with at least a partially
useful standard in cases in which the impropriety of an agency's withholding is questionable. The
Supreme Court's unwillingness to furnish a standard for determining when there has been an
"improper" withholding accentuates the burden on future requesters to make "a showing" that
this requirement has been met. See id at 166 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See also Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 631 F.2d 824, 830 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[t]he
[Consumers Union] Court's interpretation of the phrase 'improperly withheld' in FOIA therefore
does not resolve whether" a reverse-FOIA suit brought after a FOIA disclosure order could "re-
verse or remedy that initial order").
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 27 supra. Section 551(l), specifically cited in subsection (e) of the FOIA, 5
U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976), provides in part:
For the purpose of this subchapter-
(1) "agency" means each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include-
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possession of the United States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia;
5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1976). Under this provision the United States Tax Court is not an "agency."
Ostheimer v. Chumbley, 498 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mont. 1980).
91. See Comment, What Is a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom of Information Act's
Threshold Requirement, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 408, 408 & n.4.
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quirement has been actively disputed.92 Several cases decided in 1980
considered the requirement.
In Kissinger93 the Court could not dispose of William Safire's re-
quest under its "withholding" analysis,94 because Safire filed his re-
quest while the State Department still had possession of Kissinger's
telephone conversation transcripts. Instead, the Court held that the
documents Safire requested were not agency records.95 Safire's request
was limited to telephone conversation transcripts made during Kis-
singer's tenure as National Security Adviser that contained Safire's
name or discussed White House information leaks. The Court rea-
soned that as National Security Adviser, Kissinger was a member of
the President's personal staff.96 Although the "Executive Office of the
President" is subject to the FOIA, 97 the Court held that the Office of
the President is exempt.98 The Court based its conclusion on the Con-
ference Report for the 1974 FOIA amendments, which stated that the
term "agency" does not include "the President's immediate personal
staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise
and assist the President . . .,99
Although the requested documents were in the possession of the
State Department at the time of the request, the Court decided that this
did not make them agency records; the State Department had never
generated, controlled, or used them.100 The determination that posses-
92. See generaly Note, The Defmnitlon of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Information
Act, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1979).
93. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980). For further
discussion of the facts and issues in Kissinger, see notes 33-72 supra and accompanying text.
94. See text accompanying notes 56-72 supra.
95. 445 U.S. at 157.
96. Id at 156.
97. Id See note 27 supra.
98. Id; cf Crooker v. Office of the Pardon Attorney, 614 F.2d 825, 828 (2d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (the Office of the Pardon Attorney, a part of the Executive branch, comes under the FOIA
because it does not come under the exception provided for persons or "units in the Executive
Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President" (citation omitted)).
99. 445 U.S. at 156. The petitioners further argued that because of Kissinger's status as Na-
tional Security Adviser, the requested records "may have related" to the National Security Coun-
cil, an agency, and thus would have been subject to the FOIA. The Court refused to reach this
argument, finding that the request did not mention that the documents related to the Council, and
that the State Department was not otherwise on notice that it should have referred the request to
the Council. Id at 156-57. By so construing the request, the Court left unresolved whether an
agency violates the FOIA by refusing to disclose records of another agency or by failing to refer
the request to another agency. Cf. Crooker v. State Dep't, 628 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (an agency
is under no obligation to release documents the plaintiff had previously received from another
agency).
100. See 445 U.S. at 157. See also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185 n.16 (1980) ("We
certainly do not indicate, however, that physical possession, or initial creation, is by itself always
sufficient"); id at 177 n.7 ("reliance on a document does not make it an agency record if it has not
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sion without control is insufficient to render documents agency
records' 01 comports with the 1978 decision by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Goland v. CIA.102 The Goland
court held that a 1947 congressional hearing transcript, retained in
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) fies and used by the CIA to inter-
pret its own charter and related legislation, 10 3 was not an agency re-
cord. Rejecting the argument that agency possession of the requested
document automatically made it an agency record, the court concluded
that Congress's release of the transcript for a limited purpose and under
an express denomination of "Secret" indicated an intent to maintain
congressional control over the transcript. °4 Together, Kissinger and
Goland establish that the agency to whom the FOIA request is made
must have control over the requested documents.105 If another agency
been created or obtained by a federal agency. Reliance or use may well be relevant, however, to
the question of whether a record in the possession of an agency is an 'agency record' ").
101. At least one court has interpreted the decision in Kissinger as indicating the Court's ap-
proval of a "control" test for making the agency records decision. See Carson v. Department of
Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Carson the court held that pre-sentence reports
prepared by United States courts (which do not have agency status, 5 U.S.C. § 551(l)(B) (1976))
pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c), but in the possession of the Parole Commission (an agency),
were agency records under the FOIA. Id at 1015. After reviewing the effects of the Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976), and the 1974 amend-
ments to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c), see 416 U.S. 1005 (1974), the court concluded that the
Commission's heightened authority to disclose the reports and reduced discretion to withhold
them was evidence of sufficient control to accord them status as agency records. Id at 1013; Sf.
Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (prior to 1976 statutory changes
in parole procedures, pre-sentence reports were held not to be agency records under the FOIA).
102. 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Goland fourteen days after deciding Kissinger.
103. 607 F.2d at 342-43.
104. Id at 345-48 & n.48.
105. See 445 U.S. at 150-51; 607 F.2d at 346-47. See also FTC v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 971 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The usual test for a document not originated in the
agency looks to 'whether under all the facts of the case the document has passed from the control
of [its originator] and become property subject to the free disposition of the agency with which the
document resides' ") (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980)).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently reaffirmed the control test
of Goland in Holy Spirit Ass'n v. CIA, 636 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and Ryan v. Department of
Justice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Ho/y Spirit the court considered whether two groups of
documents about Congress's investigation of Korean-American relations were agency records. In
assessing the existence of congressional control over the documents, the court noted that the Go-
land court had relied on two considerations in finding agency-records status: (1) "the circum-
stances attending the document's creation" and (2) "the conditions under which it was transferred
to the agency." 636 F.2d at 841. The first group of documents was created by various congres-
sional committees and later sent to the CIA. In Ho/y Spirit the court could find no circumstances
surrounding the creation of these documents that indicated congressional intent to classify the
documents as confidential or secret, despite their "sensitive" nature. Similarly, transfer of the
documents to the CIA without any showing of intended control or classification justified agency
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or nonagency has a higher degree of control, even physical possession
will not make the requested documents become agency records of the
possessing agency. 10 6
In Forsham v. Harris' 0 7 the Supreme Court addressed the mirror
image of the question raised by Goland and Kissinger: whether docu-
ments not in the possession of an agency can nevertheless be agency
-records categorization under the "conditions under which it was transferred" criterion. Id at
842.
The second group of documents were prepared by the CIA, sent to Congress, and later re-
turned to the CIA "without instruction." After employing the two-pronged Goland test, the court
was unable to find continued congressional control and therefore held that the documents in this
group were records of the CIA. The court expressly left unresolved whether "agency-created
records, when sent to Congress, can lose their status as agency records and become exempt from
FOIA disclosure" if Congress retains control over them-a reverse application of Goland Id at
842-43.
The requesters in Ryan (which was decided before Kissinger) sought senatorial responses to a
Department of Justice questionnaire concerning procedures used for selecting and recommending
potential federal district court judges. Because the Attorney General had sole control over the.
responses, the court, employing the Goland test, held that they were agency records of the Justice
Department. The court rejected the argument that the Attorney General was not an agency be-
cause he often functioned purely as an adviser to the President. There had been no Presidential
advising with respect to the requested documents. Furthermore, the court stated that "[a]ny unit
or official that is part of an agency and has non-advisory functions cannot be considered a
nonagency in selected contexts on a case by case basis." 617 F.2d at 789. See Pacific Legal Foun-
dation v. Council on Environmental Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1264-65 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. Kis-
singer v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156-58 (1980) (Kissinger, as
National Security Adviser, acted in a purely advisory capacity and his telephone notes were there-
fore not agency records).
106. See 445 U.S. at 157 (by implication); 607 F.2d at 347. What constitutes control over
documents for the purpose of determining whether they are agency records remains unclear. Kis-
singer, like Goland, indicates that mere possession is inadequate. 445 U.S. at 157. The Ho/y Spirit
Ass'n v. CIA court perpetuated the uncertainty surrounding the requisite degree of control by
refusing to require that "Congress give contemporaneous instructions when forwarding congres-
sional records to an agency" and declining to "direct Congress to act in a particular way in order
to preserve its FOIA exemption for transferred documents." 636 F.2d at 842. The court did note
that Goland requires "some clear assertion of congressional control," id, and found that Congress
had made no such assertion over these documents.
On the other hand, photographs possessed by the Justice Department were held to be agency
records in Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 631 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980), even though a pri-
vate citizen had taken and copyrighted the photographs. The photographs had been submitted to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for use in its investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. Distinguishing SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976), in
which the court had refused to confer agency-record status upon a computerized medical refer-
ence library, the Weisberg court concluded that the photographs "reflect the . .. operation, or
decision-making functions" of the Bureau and should be considered agency records despite the
private copyright. 631 F.2d at 828 (quoting SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d at 1120). See
also Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (documents prepared by the CIA at the
request of a congressional committee are not agency records under Goland; the express desire of
the committee to prohibit disclosure other than by committee approval constitutes sufficient con-
gressional control).
107. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
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records.'0 8 The requesters in Forsham sought raw data acquired dur-
ing a long-term diabetes study by a research group funded by a subdi-
vision of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).
The plaintiff requesters claimed that the raw data were agency records
because (1) the research group was funded by and under the supervi-
sion of a federal agency; (2) the subdivision of HEW that funded the
group had authority to obtain possession and permanent custody of the
data upon request; and (3) the Food and Drug Administration had
used the group's report.' 0 9 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the data were not agency
records. 10 The Court concluded, first, that funding and supervision by
a federal agency that falls short of "substantial federal supervision"'
would not make an otherwise private group a federal entity."' Second,
though noting that records of a nonagency could become agency
records,12 the Court believed that an agency's mere potential access or
custody was insufficient to justify such a transformation." 3 Finally, the
Court concluded that "an agency must first either create or obtain a
record as a prerequisite to it becoming an 'agency record' within the
meaning of the FOIA."' 114 The Court emphasized that the "FOIA ap-
plies to records which have been in fact obtained, and not to records
108. For further discussion of the court of appeals decisions in Goland and Forsham, see Note,
Developments Under FOI4-1978, supra note 3, at 328-31. Although this issue was present in
Kissinger with respect to the MAP and RCFP requests, the Court concluded that the documents
were never withheld and therefore found it "unnecessary to decide whether the telephone notes
were 'agency records'...." 445 U.S. at 150.
109. 445 U.S. at 177.
110. Id at 176-78.
111. Id at 179-80. The Court indicated that if there were substantial federal supervision,
defined in United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815 (1976), as day-to-day supervision by the
federal government, a private group could attain the status of a federal entity, and its documents
the status of agency records. 445 U.S. at 180 & n.1 1. The Court intimated in Forsham that federal
grantees would rarely be able to meet this standard. See id at 180 & n. 11, 182. The substantial
-federal-supervision test parallels the substantial-government-control test promulgated in Ciba
-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See generally Note, Develop-
ments Under F01d -1978, supra note 3, at 328-31; Note, supra note 92, at 1111-14.
One case employing the substantial-federal-supervision test of Forsham concluded that a pri-
vate, independent group of physicians was not sufficiently supervised by its agency funding source
to render it an agency under the FOIA. See St. Mary Hosp. v. Philadelphia Professional Stan-
dards Review Org., Inc., 48 Ad. L.2d 1131, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Contra, Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. HEW, 449 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1978) (decided before Forsham).
112. 445 U.S. at 181.
113. Id at 181-86. In his dissent, Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's determination that
"[r]ecords of a nonagency certainly could become records of an agency as well," but he disagreed
with the Court's reasons for concluding that it did not occur in this case. Id at 187 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id at 181).
114. Id at 182 (majority opinion).
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which merely couldhave been obtained,"' 15 but declined to define those
terms beyond the facts of the case." t6
Forsham establishes that documents are not agency records unless
the agency receiving the request has "created or obtained" them. In
making this determination the Court considers the agency's use of the
records, the degree of federal supervision over a nonagency, whether a
federal agency has exercised a right of access to nonagency documents,
or other special circumstances." I7 Justice Brennan noted in dissent in
Forsham, however, that the Court "never addresse[d] the full, com-
bined force of the arguments," and that the Court's opinion "offer[ed]
no manageable standards of any kind."" t8
Forsham's requirement of substantial federal supervision of the
agency creating the records and Kissinger's unwillingness to attribute
documents to a possessing agency unless that agency controls them, in-
dicate that agencies may be able to circumvent the FOIA's disclosure
provisions in certain instances. Substantial federal supervision, which
is synonymous with day-to-day agency control, 19 is difficult for a re-
quester to demonstrate. Similarly, a requester may find it hard to prove
that records in the physical possession of an agency are subject to the
requisite degree of control by the agency. In sum, in 1980 the FOIA's
threshold requirements were shown to be significant obstacles for re-
questers to overcome.
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION
Exemption 1 of the FOIA, the national security exemption, applies
to documents that are classified pursuant to an executive order that sets
standards for keeping records secret in the interest of national defense
115. Id at 186 (emphasis in original).
116. The Court noted: "We need not categorize what agency conduct is necessary to support a
finding that it has 'obtained' documents, since an unexercised right of access clearly does not
satisfy this requirement." Id at 186 n.17.
117. See id at 177 n.7, 180-82. Justice Brennan's dissent in Forsham proposed two different
criteria to consider in determining whether records of a nonagency became agency records: "the
importance of the record to an understanding of Government activities" and the existence of "a
link between the agency and the record." 445 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The first could
be proved by observing the agency's application and dependence on the information in its writings
and internal decisions. Id The second could be verified by examining
the degree to which the impetus for the creation of the record came from the agency or
was developed independently, the degree to which the creation of the record was funded
publicly or privately, the extent of governmental supervision of the creation of the rec-
ord, and the extent of continuing governmental control over the record.
Id at 190.
118. Id at 189 nn.5 & 6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. See note 111 supra.
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or foreign policy.' 20 The FOIA expressly provides that, to be exempt, a
document must be "in fact properly classified pursuant to such Execu-
tive order." 121 Executive Order No. 12,065,122 which President Carter
issued on June 28, 1978, establishes the current classification criteria.
When documents requested under the FOIA were classified pursuant
to a prior executive order, however, confusion arises concerning which
order should be applied by the agency processing the request or by the
court reviewing the agency's classification decision. The Supreme
Court left this question open in its 1973 decision in EPA v. Mink. 123
In Lesar v. United States Department of Justice 124 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit squarely addressed the issue,
holding that the executive order in force when agency officials last clas-
sified the document is controlling.' 25 Lesar requested documents and
reports from the Department of Justice about the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) inquiry into Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and his
assassination. The requested records had been classified under a 1972
executive order in effect at the time of the request.' 26 In response to
Lesar's FOIA request, the Justice Department released some of the
documents but withheld others pursuant to various FOIA exemptions
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). Exemption 1 exempts from disclosure "matters that are...
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order." Id
Use of information classified by "Executive order, statute, or regulation" may also be regu-
lated under the Classified Information Procedures Act enacted October 15, 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-
456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 361 (West Supp. 1981). The Act requires criminal
defendants to notify the government and the court of any classified information that the defendant
intends to disclose at trial or pretrial proceedings and provides procedures for the review of such
information before its introduction in open court. See generally S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong,, 2d
Sess. (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7738.
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976).
122. 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 note, at 64 (West Supp. 1980), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,148, § 5-209, 3 C.F.R. 412, 418 (1980), and Exec. Order No.
12,163, § 1-903(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 435, 443 (1980). For further discussion of Executive Order No.
12,065, see 1 J. O'REILLY, supra note 25, at § 11.03; Comment, Developments under FO14-1979,
supra note 3, at 146-48.
123. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). In Mink a new executive order became effective while a FOIA suit, in
which documents had been withheld under authority of a prior order, was on appeal. The
Supreme Court applied the earlier order's criteria but did not resolve the issue of which order was
controlling, because it concluded that the records were properly classified under the new order as
well. Id at 84 nn.9 & 10. See Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 480 n.42 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
124. 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
125. Id at 480.
126. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-1975 Compilation) (superseded).
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and a court order.'27 In a suit to compel disclosure of the records the
district court upheld the agency's reliance on the 1972 executive order
to withhold excerpts of the documents.' 28
On December 1, 1978, about four months after the district court's
decision in Lesar, Executive Order No. 12,065 took effect.' 29 The new
executive order states that information can be classified under the crite-
ria of the new order or under prior executive orders. 30 In addition,
although under the prior order agencies were required to classify docu-
ments at the time of their origin,' 3 ' the new order specifically autho-
rizes classification at a later date.132 On appeal, Lesar argued that the
case should be remanded for a reclassification of the withheld materials
under the new executive order. The court disagreed, holding that "a
reviewing court should assess classffcation under the Executive Order in
force at the time the responsible offcial finally [classifies the docu-
ments]."' 33 The court reasoned that under the terms of the new execu-
tive order, a document properly classified under the prior order would
retain its status unless the agency reclassified the documents while the
new order was in effect. 134
Lesar also argued that two of the requested documents had not
been classified at the time of their origin as required by the prior execu-
tive order 35 and that violation of this procedural criterion required re-
lease of the documents or a remand to determine whether disclosure
127. The department withheld records under Exemptions 1, 2, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E) of the
FOIA and pursuant to Lee v. Kelly, Nos. 76-1185 & 76-1186 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1977) (ordering the
FBI's actual surveillance records and tapes on Dr. King to be put under seal for 50 years).
128. See Lesar v. Department of Justice, 455 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1978), af'd, 636 F.2d at
472 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
129. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 note, at 64
(West Supp. 1980), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,148, § 5-209, 3 C.F.R. 412, 418 (1980) and
Exec. Order No. 12,163, § 1-903(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 435, 443 (1980).
130. Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 6-102, 3 C.F.R. 190, 204 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401
note, at 71 (West Supp. 1980). See also Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d at 480.
131. Although the executive order did not explicitly require classification at origin, an agency
directive did require such classification. See National Security Council Directive of May 17, 1972,
Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Secur-
ity Information IV (A), 37 Fed. Reg. 10,053, 10,056-57 (1972) ("At the time of origination, each
document shall be marked with its assigned security classification"), discussed in Lesar v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 636 F.2d at 483-84.
132. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 1-606, 3 C.F.R. 190, 194-95, reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401
note, at 66 (West Supp. 1980).
133. 636 F.2d at 480 (emphasis in original). The court noted that materials originally classi-
fied under one executive order could be reclassified after enactment of a new order or after a
FOIA request, and that a reviewing court should assess the document's classification in light of the
executive order "under which the agency made its ultimate classification determination." Id
134. Id
135. Id at 483-84.
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would damage the national security. Lesar based his contention on the
decision in Haperin v. Department of State.136 In that case the court
had ordered a remand to the district court for in camera review of doc-
uments-allegedly exempt under Exemption 1-because the agency
had failed to classify the requested documents at their origination and
had failed to follow the substantive criteria of the executive order. 137
There was no substantive violation in Lesar, however, and the Lesar
court held that the procedural defect, by itself, did not indicate an "un-
dermining" of the overall classification process and thus did not war-
rant a remand. 138
Though recognizing that certain substantive, as well as procedural,
violations may require remand for in camera review, the Lesar court
explained that "others may be insignificant, undermining not at all the
agency's classification decision. We believe that the procedural viola-
tion involved in this case plainly falls within the latter category." 139
What other procedural defects will be found too insignificant to require
in camera review remains unclear.' 40 The court's willingness to over-
look a procedural defect in spite of the statutory requirement that a
document be "in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order"'141 permits at least some agency mishandling and denies disclo-
sure to requesters although the statute ostensibly provides no exemp-
tion.' 42
136. 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
137. Id at 703-07.
138. 636 F.2d at 481-85 (footnotes omitted).
139. d at 485 (footnote omitted). The Lesar court was careful not to condone procedural
defects, however, noting that Exemption 1 requires conformity with the procedural as well as
substantive criteria. Id
140. In camera inspection is necessary, stated Chief Judge Wright in a recent opinion, in cases
"[w]here the agency affidavits merely parrot the language of the statute and are drawn in con-
clusory terms ... " and make meaningful de novo review impossible. Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d
1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Circumstances that support the use of in camera inspection include
judicial economy, agency bad faith, disputes concerning the document's contents, agency proposal
of in camera inspection, and the presence of a strong public interest in disclosure of the disputed
records. Id at 1298-99. See also Stephenson v. IRS, 629 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing a
summary judgment for the agency based on generic and misleading affidavits and remanding for
further factual development but not specifying the method to be used).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(B) (1976).
142. In contrast, a different panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
put prime importance on the literal language of the FOIA in Gregory v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 631 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), rev'g inpart 470 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979).
The court of appeals in Gregory reversed the lower court determination that Exemption 8, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976), which exempts matters "contained in... reports prepared by... an
agency responsible for the regulation. . . of financial institutions" did not apply to reports of the
FDIC describing two banks which had closed. Despite the district court's fear that application of
the exemption would be inconsistent with the purposes of the FOIA, the court of appeals applied
the statute "in accordance with its plain meaning," 631 F.2d at 898, holding that the disputed
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit further
defined the obligations of agencies to follow executive order classifica-
tion procedures in Baez v. United States Department of Justice.'43 Joan
Baez had requested all information containing her name possessed by
the FBI. Several of the requested documents were withheld under Ex-
emption 1. As in Lesar, some of the documents had not been classified
at their origin, but were classified only after the FOIA request. 44 After
Baez filed suit in district court, but before the case came to trial, Execu-
tive Order No. 12,065145 became effective. The withheld information
was then reclassified under the new executive order. The district court
upheld all the exemption claims and denied disclosure. 146
On appeal Baez argued that the documents that were not classified
until her request could not receive Exemption 1 protection; failure to
classify them at origination violated a procedural requirement under
the prior executive order, and Exemption 1 specifically requires com-
pliance with the classifying procedures. The court of appeals first held
that, as in Lesar, the procedural defect in Baez did not warrant either
remand for in camera inspection or release. 147 Second, the court found
that all the withheld records were properly classified under the new
executive order. Because that order permitted delayed classification,
Exemption 1 authorized the withholding. The court also concluded
that agencies may review their initial classification decisions after re-
ceiving FOIA requests, or when a current executive order is superseded
or amended while a FOIA case is still under consideration in the trial
court. Such reclassification, the court explained, ensures protection of
national security interests, which is the purpose of Exemption 1.148 The
Baez decision thus leaves an agency free to withhold previously unclas-
sified records under Exemption 1 if, after a FOIA request, the agency
perceives a need to protect the requested information for national se-
curity reasons. Both Lesar and Baez illustrate the trend of increased
records were protected by Exemption 8. For further discussion of the district court opinion in
Gregory, see Comment, Developments Under FOIA-1979, supra note 3, at 168-69.
143. 1 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. (P-H) 80,238 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
144. See id. at 80,593; Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d at 484 n.64
145. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 note, at 64
(West Supp. 1980), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,148, § 5-209, 3 C.F.R. 412, 418 (1980), and
Exec. Order No. 12,163, § 1-903(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 435, 443 (1980).
146. No. 76-1922, Statement of Reasons (D.D.C. July 5, 1979) (unpublished), aft'd, 1 GOV'T
DISCLOSURE SERV. (P-H) 1 80,238 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
147. 1 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. (P-H) at 80,593-95; see Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cus-
toms Serv., 1 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. (P-H) 1 79,266 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
148. 1 GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. (P-H) at 80,594-95.
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deference toward agency classification of national security informa-
tion.149
III. THE FEDERAL STATUTES EXEMPTION
Exemption 3 makes the FOIA's disclosure provisions inapplicable
when another federal statute expressly "(A) requires that the matters be
withheld. . , or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld .... -150 When an
agency relies on Exemption 3 to deny disclosure, the court must inter-
pret provisions of acts other than the FOIA to determine whether the
requested information is exempt. The Consumer Product Safety Act151
(CPSA), the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act,152 and sec-
tion 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code 153 all received judicial atten-
tion in 1980, as did several other federal statutes. 154
149. Cf. Hayden v. National Security Agency, 452 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.D.C. 1978) (the dis-
closure of certain National Security Agency operations, intelligence sources, and methods is ex-
empt under Exemption 1), aj'd sub noma. Hayden v. National Security Agency/Central Security
Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("This is precisely the sort of situation where Congress
intended reviewing courts to respect the expertise of an agency"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), discussed in notes 155-76 infra and
accompanying text.
152. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified in 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-77 (West Supp.
1981)), discussed in notes 177-97 infra and accompanying text.
153. I.R.C. § 6103, discussed in notes 198-213 infra and accompanying text.
154. One case brought the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976), within the ambit of
Exemption 3. In Reston v. FCC, 492 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1980), the court held that an amateur
radio operator's recordings of a religious sect's radio transmission, which he gave to the Federal
Communications Commission, were exempt from FOIA disclosure because section 605 of the
Communications Act prohibited disclosure of such communications to all but a specified group of
persons, which did not include the FOIA requester. The statute's specific prohibitions on dis-
closure qualified it as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. But see Church of Scientology v.
Postal Serv., 633 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1980), holding that section 410(c)(6) of the Postal Reorgani-
zation Act, 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(6) (1976), which exempts "investigatory files, whether or not consid-
ered closed, compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a
party other than the Postal Service," is not a withholding statute under Exemption 3 of the FOIA
because the provision lacks sufficient specificity. See notes 250-66 infra and accompanying text.
Another 1980 case involving Exemption 3 defined the "intelligence sources" provision of the
National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976), which requires the Director of the CIA to
protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In this case-the first to
generate a definition of "intelligence sources"-the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit construed the term to mean:
[A] person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide the
CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function
effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confiden-
tiality of those who provide it.
Sims v. CIA, 49 Ad. L.2d 301, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court declined to adopt the broader
definition proposed by the CIA. Id at 310-11. See also Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269, 275
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("authors, publishers and books involved in clandestine propaganda activities"
are not "intelligence sources and methods" under section 403(d)(3)).
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A. The Consumer Product Safety Act.
The Supreme Court in Consumer Product Safety Commission v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,55 resolved a conflict that had arisen between the
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits over the effect of
section 6(b)(1) 15 6 of the CPSA on disclosures made pursuant to FOIA
requests. Section 6(b)(1) requires the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission to notify manufacturers who had submitted information to the
agency and to supply them with a summary of any proposed disclosure,
if the identity of the manufacturer could be ascertained from the dis-
closed information. The Commission must give the submitters a rea-
sonable time to comment on the disclosure 57 and must ensure that the
disclosure is fair and accurate.'58
In Pierce & Stevens Chemical Corp. v. United States Consumer
Product Safety Commission'5 9 and GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer
Product Safety Commission,160 manufacturers that had submitted infor-
mation to the Commission sued to prevent disclosure of the informa-
tion, claiming that the Commission had violated the "fair and
accurate" provisions of section 6(b)(1). t6t Although the Commission
155. 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976). Section 6(b)(1) provides in part:
[The Commission shall, to the extent practicable, notify, and provide a summary of the
information to, each manufacturer or private labeler of any consumer product to which
such information pertains, if the manner in which such consumer product is to be desig-
nated or described in such information will permit the public to ascertain readily the
identity of such manufacturer or private labeler, and shall provide such manufacturer or
private labeler with a reasonable opportunity to submit comments to the Commission in
regard to such information. The Commission shall take reasonable steps to assure, prior
to its public disclosure thereof, that information from which the identity of such manu-
facturer or private labeler may be readily ascertained is accurate, and that such disclo-
sure is fair in the circumstances and reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of
this chapter.
Id For further discussion of section 6(b)(l), see Note, The Impact of Restrictive Disclosure Provi-
sions on Freedom of Information Act Requests: An Analysis of Section 6(b)(1) of the Consumer
Product SafetyAct, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (1980).
157. Section 6(b)(1) requires the CPSC to notify manufacturers "not less than 30 days prior to
its public disclosure." 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976).
158. Id See note 156 supra.
159. 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978).
160. 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1979), af§'d, 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
161. See note 156 supra. An action to prevent disclosure under the FOIA is known as a re-
verse-FOIA suit. The Supreme Court discussed the issue of reverse-FOIA suits in Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). For further discussion of reverse-FOIA issues, see Clement, The
Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Re-
verse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REv. 587 (1977); Note, The Reverse FOIA
Lawsuit: Routes to NondisclosureAfter Chrysler, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 269 (1980); Note, Protect-
ing Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure after Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 109 (1980); Comment, Developments Under FOIA-1979, supra note
3, at 141-46; Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-The Reverse FOA Suit, 1976 DUKE
LJ. 330.
1980 FOIA DEVELOPMENTS
had admittedly violated section 6(b)(1) in each case by attempting to
disclose inaccurate information, 162 it claimed that the requirements of
section 6(b)(1) applied only to affirmative, discretionary disclosures
and not disclosures made under the FOIA. 163 In the earlier Pierce &
Stevens decision, the Second Circuit accepted the Commission's argu-
ment and permitted disclosure.164 The Third Circuit, in GTE Sylvania,
disagreed with the Pierce & Stevens decision, holding instead that the
reference in section 6(b)(1) to "public disclosure" applies to disclosure
under the FOIA and that section 6 is a withholding statute for purposes
of Exemption 3.165
On certiorari review of GTE Sylvania in the Supreme Court, the
Commission again argued that section 6(b)(1) did not govern disclo-
sures under the FOIA. Relying heavily on Judge Seitz's in-depth anal-
ysis in the court of appeals decision in GTE Sylvania, 66 the Court
unanimously held that the provisions of section 6(b)(1) applied to dis-
closures under the FOIA. 67 Because section 6(b)(1) governs the "pub-
lic disclosure of any information,"' 68 and "as a matter of common
usage the term 'public' is properly understood as including persons who
are FOIA requesters,"' 69 the Court rejected the Commission's position
that section 6(b)(1) applied only to discretionary disclosures. That sec-
tion 6(b)(2)' 70 of the CPSA does not include FOIA requests in its list-
ing of express exceptions to the requirements of section 6(b)(1)
supported this conclusion. 171
162. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d at 799-800; Pierce
& Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d at 1387.
163. 598 F.2d at 801; 585 F.2d at 1386.
164. 585 F.2d at 1386-89. See generally Comment, Developments Under FOIA-1979, supra
note 3, at 149-53.
165. 598 F.2d at 803, 813.
166. In GTE Sylvania the court of appeals rebutted the Commission's claim after lengthy dis-
cussions of the statutory language, the legislative history, and the FOIA's inconsistencies with the
CPSA. 598 F.2d at 802-15.
167. 447 U.S. at 123-24.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976).
169. 447 U.S. at 108-09. There are, however, many private parties requesting information
under the FOIA who might never share information disclosed to them with others.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(2) (1976), which exempts, among other things, information concern-
ing imminently hazardous products, and disclosure made in the course of administrative or judi-
cial proceedings under the CPSA.
171. 447 U.S. at 109. The Court was "reluctant" to conclude that Congress had inadvertently
failed to include FOIA requests in the listing of exceptions to section 6(b)(1). "That Congress was
aware of the relationship between § 6 and the FOIA when it enacted the CPSA is exhibited by the
fact that Congress in § 6(a)(1) specifically incorporated by reference the nine exemptions of the
FOIA .. " Id. (Section 6(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(1) (1976) provides, in part, that "[n]othing
contained in this chapter shall be deemed to require the release of any information described by
subsection (b) of section 552 of Title 5 .... ").
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The Court similarly found no basis in the legislative history of the
CPSA for distinguishing between affirmative disclosures by the Com-
mission and disclosure following a FOIA request in applying section
6(b)(1).1 72 Nor were post-enactment legislative and administrative in-
terpretations of section 6(b)(1) deemed authoritative. 173 Finally, the
Court resolved potential inconsistencies between section 6(b)(1) and
the FOIA time requirements for releasing information 74 by holding
that section 6(b)(1) is a withholding statute under Exemption 3.175 The
Commission had contended that it could not comply with FOIA's time
limits if the requirement in section 6(b)(1) of notice to manufacturers
were applied to FOIA requests.176 Under the Court's holding that Ex-
emption 3 applies, the Commission may comply fully with section
6(b)(1) without running afoul of the timing provisions of the FOIA.
B. The Federal Trade Commission Act. 177
On May 28, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980.178 The former Federal
Trade Commission Act qualified as a withholding statute under Ex-
emption 3 of the FOIA because it prohibited disclosure of particular
kinds of information. 179 Several provisions of the 1980 Act further re-
172. 447 U.S. at 110-16.
173. Id at 116-20. The Commission relied upon a statement by Representative Moss-a
sponsor of the CPSA generally but not of the information disclosure provision actually adopted-
made during an oversight committee meeting in which he agreed with former Commission Chair-
man Richard 0. Simpson that section 6(b)(l) was inapplicable to FOIA requests. The petitioners
also attached weight to a conference report accompanying the 1976 amendments adding section
29(e) to the CPSA. Although the new section prescribed conditions for the release of information
to other federal agencies or state and local authorities, and was therefore unrelated to the work-
ings of section 6(b)(l), petitioners noted the report's statement that section 6(b) did not relate to
FOIA requests.
174. Under the FOIA an agency must "determine within ten days... whether to comply with
[a FOIA] request"; the agency must notify the requester "immediately" of its determination. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976). The CPSA, however, requires the Commission to notify manufac-
turers at least 30 days before public disclosure to give manufacturers an opportunity to comment.
15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976).
175. See 447 U.S. at 121-22.
176. See id at 121.
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976) (as amended).
178. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-77 (West Supp. 1981).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976) (amended 1980), provided in part: "The Commission shall also
have power ... (f) To make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained
by it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall deem expedient in the
public interest. ... Because the Commission does not have power to disclose trade secrets or
names of customers, section 46(f) arguably operates as a withholding statute with respect to those
categories of information. See Hunt v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 484 F. Supp. 47,
49-50 (D.D.C. 1979) (construing a similar provision of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 12 (1976) (superseded)); Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 338, 342 (D.D.C. 1979) (by
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strict the scope and quantity of information that may be disclosed pur-
suant to a request made to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
under the FOIA. First, section 6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act180 was amended to expand the categories of documents that the
FTC may not disclose. Previously, the section prohibited disclosure of
"trade secrets and names of customers."'u8 The new statute expands
the prohibition to include "any trade secret or any commercial or
financial information which is obtained from any person and which is
privileged or confidential."' I8 2 The amendment thus incorporates into
the Federal Trade Commission Act the language of FOIA Exemption
4.183 The effect of this amendment is to prohibit disclosure of those
categories of information previously exempted under Exemption 4
from mandatory disclosure, thereby eliminating the FTC's discretion-
ary authority to disclose such records. 84
implication), af§'d, 1979-2 Trade Cas. 1 79,524 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
FTC, 406 F. Supp. 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (employing the earlier version of Exemption 3, which
dealt with matters "specifically exempt[ed] from disclosure" by statute).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976) (amended 1980).
181. Id See generally Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441
U.S. 943 (1979).
182. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.A. § 46(f) (West Supp.
1981), which amended the Federal Trade Commission Act to read in part:
The Commission shall also have power ... (f) To make public from time to time
such portions of the information obtained by it hereunder as are in the public interest;
... Provided, That the Commission shall not have any authority to make public any
trade secret or any commercial or financial information which is obtained from any per-
son and which is privileged or confidential ....
Id (emphasis in original).
183. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976) provides that FOIA disclosure obligations do not apply to
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential." Id
184. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2309, 2310 ("The effect of the provision is to remove any discretionary au-
thority that the Commission has to make public any information which is exempt from disclosure
under the fourth exemption" of the FOIA). Generally, the FOIA's exemptions are permissive
rather than mandatory. An exemption "demarcates the agency's obligation to disclose, it does not
foreclose disclosure." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
Although section 6(f) as amended restricts the flow of certain information to the public, it
allows disclosure to appropriate federal and state agencies for law enforcement purposes. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 46(f) (West Supp. 1981). See generally Fleming v. FTC, 1980-1981 Trade Cas. 1
63,642 (D.D.C. 1980). An FTC decision to release a clothing manufacturer's secrets to state en-
forcement officials is exempt from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). See Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 496 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
The amended Act also provides that line-of-business reports may not be disclosed to the
public or to any federal agency. 15 U.S.C.A. § 46(f) (West Supp. 1981). Congress had previously
passed three separate restrictions on FTC disclosure of line-of-business reports. "The purpose of
section 4 [of the new Act] is to make permanent the protection against disclosure of line-of-busi-
ness data in such a way that an individual company could be identified." S. REP. No. 500, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2268, 2272.
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Second, the Federal Trade Commission Act was amended to in-
clude a new confidentiality section designed to complement the disclo-
sure provisions of section 6(f).18 5 Under the new provision,
information the FTC acquires, other than an exempt investigation
file, '8 6 is to be considered confidential if so denoted by the submitter. 18 7
Such information is not to be disclosed unless the Commission deter-
mines that it was improperly classified as confidential and the Commis-
sion notifies the submitter of the proposed disclosure.' 88 The Act
specifically authorizes a submitter who disagrees with the FTC's deter-
mination that the information was improperly classified to file for a
stay of disclosure.' 89 The Act provides that the information may not be
disclosed until the court has acted upon the application for a stay. 190
The Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 thus gives
parties who have supplied the FTC with information the statutory au-
thority to protect that information from damaging disclosure under the
FOIA.' 91
Finally, section 14(f) of the new Act 92 provides that any informa-
tion obtained in a law enforcement investigation either by compulsory
process or by voluntary submission is exempt from FOIA disclosure.193
This provision is intended to have a withholding effect similar to that of
the investigatory records exemption 194 of the FOIA without any of the
limitations present in this FOIA exemption's subsections. 195 This new
185. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-2 (West Supp. 1981).
186. See note 193 infra and accompanying text.
187. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-2(c)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
188. Id §§ 57b-2(c)(1), (2).
189. Id §§ 57b-2(c)(1), (3).
190. Id
191. Not all of the provisions of the amended section 57b-2 are totally new. Some are
modeled after the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976), as amendedby Pub.
L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1154 (1980), or are clarifications of certain currently existing FTC proce-
dures. See S. RaP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-28, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2268, 2293-95.
192. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-2(f) (West Supp. 1981).
193. Id Section 14(f) provides:
. Any material which is received by the Commission in any investigation, a purpose
of which is to determine whether any person may have violated any provision of the laws
administered by the Commission, and which is provided pursuant to any compulsory
process under sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title or which is provided voluntarily
in place of such compulsory process shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of
Title 5.
Id § 57b-2(f). For a discussion of this provision, see Dairymen, Inc. v. FTC, 1980-2 Trade Cas.
63,479, at 76,509 (D.D.C. 1980).
194. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). The text of the investigatory records exemption is set forth in
note 250 infra.
195. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33,
reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2309, 2315-16.
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section gives the FTC greater withholding authority over information
obtained in law enforcement proceedings than is provided by the
FOIA.1 96 Moreover, this provision will be applied retrospectively as
well as prospectively to documents obtained by the FTC.197
C. Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Interpretation of section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code,198
which governs the disclosure of tax returns and return information,
continued to be the subject of substantial litigation in 1980. The courts
interpreting this section agree that it qualifies as a withholding statute
under Exemption 3.199 Typically, the more difficult question is whether
section 6103 permits disclosure of the particular requested informa-
tion.20o
In Zale Corp. v. IRS 20 the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia provided a novel interpretation of the interaction between sec-
196. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2315-16. To withhold documents under the investigatory records exemption
an agency must show that the requested records are "investigatory records compiled for law en-
forcement purposes" and that disclosure would violate one or more of the six other listed criteria.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). Under the new section 14(0, if the FTC can show that the re-
quested materials were received "in any [law enforcement] investigation," the records are exempt
from FOIA disclosure. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-2(f) (West Supp. 1981). All FTC investigation files
therefore receive a blanket exemption under the new provision which would not necessarily exist
under Exemption 7. For an application of this new provision, see Braswell, Inc. v. FTC, 985
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-9 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
197. See Rigler v. FTC, 1980-1981 Trade Cas. T 63,730 (D.D.C. 1981) ("[T]he legislative his-
tory of section [14(0] demonstrates that it applies to documents collected before but sought to be
withheld after its effective date").
198. I.R.C. § 6103. Under this lengthy provision, the Internal Revenue Service may disclose
tax "return information" to various state and federal agencies, private taxpayers, and persons
requesting documents under the FOIA only if "the Secretary determines that such disclosure
would not seriously impair Federal tax administration." Id § 6103(e)(6).
199. See, eg., Huff v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,327 (D. Alaska 1980); Cliff v. IRS, 496 F.
Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. IRS, 493 F. Supp. 549 (D.D.C. 1980); Ammen
v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,677 (W.D. La. 1980); Abbott Laboratories v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 84,753 (D.D.C. 1980); Ashton v. Kurtz, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,505 (D.D.C. 1980); Cal-Am
Corp. v. IRS, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,144 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Bernal v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
84,864 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Wolfe v. IRS, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,910 (D. Colo. 1980); Moody v. IRS,
80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,492 (D. Colo. 1980); Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. IM. 1980).
200. See, e-g., Cliff v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (memoranda prepared by IRS
staff discussing the effects of various IRS Revenue Procedures on the potential or actual tax liabil-
ity of several specific taxpayers constitute tax return information exempt from disclosure); Cal-Am
Corp. v. IRS, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,144 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (administrative audit files of a corpora-
tion under investigation are exempt from disclosure under I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2), Exemption 3 of the
FOIA in conjunction with section 6103, and FOIA Exemption 7(A)); Moody v. IRS, 80-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 83,492, 83,495-96 (D. Colo. 1980) ("the IRS can assert other FOIA exemptions to justify
the non-disclosure of return information [as defined in section 6103] without a determination of
impairment by the Secretary").
201. 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979).
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tion 6103 and Exemption 3. In Zale a corporation under civil and
criminal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service sought
disclosure under the FOIA of several thousand pages of documents in
the Service's investigation files, including an IRS Special Agent Report,
which the Service had refused to release. The Service claimed that the
disputed records were exempt under Exemptions 7(A) 20 2 and 3 of the
FOIA in conjunction with section 6103(e)(6) of the Code.203
Before reaching the merits of the claimed exemptions, the court
held that section 6103(e)(6), which allows the disclosure of tax return
information when the Secretary of the Treasury concludes disclosure
will not injure tax administration, is the "sole standard governing re-
lease of tax return information.' '2°4 The standards of Exemption 3 do
not, the court stated, apply to the Service's refusal to disclose informa-
tion under section 6103(e)(6). 205 The court compared the FOIA,
"which calls for the release of information to the public at large with no
showing of need required," with section 6103(e)(6), a highly particular-
ized statute seeking to balance disclosure and privacy interests with re-
spect to the different groups seeking disclosure.20 6 Even though the
language of Exemption 3 does not permit nondisclosure based on dis-
cretionary withholding statutes, 20 7 the court concluded that the FOIA
was not intended to supersede section 6103, especially because section
6103 was enacted shortly after the 1976 amendments to the FOIA208
and by the same Congress.20 9
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976), set out in note 250 infra and discussed further in notes
250-66 infra and accompanying text.
203. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6) ("Return information with respect to any taxpayer may be open to
inspection by or disclosure to any person authorized by this subsection to inspect any return of
such taxpayer if the Secretary determines that such disclosure would not seriously impair Federal
tax administration").
204. 481 F. Supp. at 490. See also Holmes v. IRS, 46 FED. TAXES (P-H) 80-5562 (S.D. Cal.
1980).
205. The court did note that section 6103 satisfied the requirements for a withholding statute
under Exemption 3. 481 F. Supp. at 490 n.13. The court concluded that the definition of "return
information" found in section 6103(b)(2) was "sufficiently particularized" to fulfill the FOIA man-
date that the statute "[refer] to particular types of matters to be withheld." Id The court also
analogized the Secretary's finding that disclosure would impair tax administration to the "particu-
lar criteria for withholding" required by Exemption 3. Id
206. Id at 488-89.
207. Exemption 3 refers to statutes that require withholding, establish "particular criteria for
withholding," or specify "particular types of matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
Cf. 481 F. Supp. at 491 n.13 (indicating reasons why section 6103 is a withholding statute).
208. 481 F. Supp. at 489-90. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(a), 90
Stat. 1520, 1667-85 (1976) (enacted Oct. 4, 1976); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No.
94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1241, 1247 (1976) (enacted Sept. 13, 1976).
209. 481 F. Supp. at 488-90.
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The court's determination that section 6103 governs all disclosures
of tax return information shifts judicial review of the Service's decision
to withhold documents from the FOIA, which requires de novo re-
view,2 10 to the Administrative Procedure Act,21' under which the Serv-
ice's decision must be upheld as long as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.212 Under Zale, the Service's exercise of the dis-
cretion granted under section 6103 to withhold information in the in-
terest of tax administration will be upheld in almost all instances
because this discretion is broader than normally allowed under the
FOIA.21 3
210. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
211. Id §§701-706.
212. See Ginter v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,731 (E.D. Ark. 1980). The Administrative
Procedure Act provides:
The reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law .... In making the foregoing determinations, the court
shall review the whole record ....
5 U.S.C. § 706(l)(A) (1976). For further discussion about which standard of review should be
employed in reviewing an agency's decision to withhold documents, see Comment, Developments
Under FOIA-1979, supra note 3, at 141-46.
The thrust of a suit under the FOIA is to determine de novo whether the agency's decision to
withhold the requested records under the claimed exemption was proper. See I J. O'REILLY,
supra note 25, § 8.04. The court in Zale held that de novo review of the Secretary's decision that
release of the requested records would impair tax administration is "neither necessary nor desira-
ble." 481 F. Supp. at 490. Instead, the standard of review is "highly deferential. . . . The court
must accept the Service's determination in this area of its acknowledged experience and technical
competence so long as that determination is rational and has support in the record." Id; see
Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. II. 1980); Gf Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. IRS, 49 Ad. L. 2d
1083 (D. Mass. 1980) (even assuming that Zale is correct in its holding that section 6103 preempts
the FOIA, this does not "preclude District Court review over denial of disclosure once the talis-
man of 'return information' is raised" and thus "the IRS argument that a Vaughn index is not a
per se requirement" has no merit).
213. See United States v. First Nat'l State Bank, 616 F.2d 668, 672 n.6 (3d Cir.) cert. deniedsub
nom. Levey v. United States, 447 U.S. 905 (1980). Courts have generally relied on Zale for the
proposition that section 6103 is the sole standard governing the release of tax return information
so that a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury to withhold the requested records super-
sedes the FOIA disclosure provisions. See, eg., Hulsey v. IRS, 497 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Tex. 1980);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 80-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 85,558 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. IRS, 493 F. Supp. 549 (D.D.C. 1980); Abbott Laboratories v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
84,753 (D.D.C. 1980); Cal-Am Corp. v. IRS, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,144 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Bernal v.
IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,864 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Wolfe v. IRS, 80-I U.S. Tax Cas. 83,910 (D.
Colo. 1980); Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Despite Zale's novel interpreta-
tion, courts have relied alternatively on the analysis that section 6103 is a withholding statute
under Exemption 3. See cases cited above and note 205 supra But see Ginter v. IRS, 80-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 85,731 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (relying solely on Zale's analysis that section 6103 supersedes
the FOIA). For a more complete discussion of section 6103 as an Exemption 3 withholding stat-
ute, see Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
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IV. THE INTRA-AGENCY MEMORANDUM EXEMPTION
Interpretation of Exemption 5 of the FOIA has traditionally been
a controversial subject, 214 and cases construing the exemption in 1980
followed that pattern. Exemption 5 relieves agencies from FOIA dis-
closure obligations when the requested materials are "inter-agency or
intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. ' 215
The exemption thus operates to "exempt those documents .. .nor-
mally privileged in the civil discovery context. '21 6 Although many
cases decided this year applied the attorney-client privilege or the attor-
ney work-product privilege in refusing to order disclosure, 217 the more
important controversies involved the deliberative-process privilege,218
which protects from FOIA disclosure those government materials gen-
erated to assist an agency in its decision-making. 219 Exemption 5
shields documents that are deliberative-subjective rather than fac-
214. See 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 25, § 15.01. For a discussion of developments under Ex-
emption 5 in prior years, see Comment, Developments Under FOA-1979, supra note 3, at 155-61;
Note, Developments Under FOIA-1977, supra note 3, at 219-23; Note, Developments Under
FOIA-1975, supra note 3, at 382-95; Comment, Developments Under FOIA-1973, supra note
11, at 266-74; Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1969, supra note 3, at 85-9 1.
215. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
216. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975). A prior ruling on privileges in
the civil discovery context, however, is not controlling in a FOIA action when a privilege is
claimed. See Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1980).
217. See, e.g., Radowich v. United States Attorney, 501 F. Supp. 284 (D. Md. 1980); Canadian
Javelin, Ltd. v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1980); Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 1980-2 Trade Cas,
75,987 (D.D.C. 1980); Buffalo Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 104 L.R.R.M. 2137 (W.D.N.Y. 1980);
Moody v. IRS, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,492 (D. Colo. 1980); Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 1980-1 Trade Cas.
77,914 (D.D.C. 1980); Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. I11. 1980); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Harris, 488 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). But see Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of
Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (the court denied the use of the attorney-client privilege, the
attorney-work product privilege, or Exemptions 5 and 7 of the FOIA in affirming a district court
order for the release of DOE memoranda between attorneys and agency auditors).
218. See, e.g., Brinton v. Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (legal opin-
ions of the State Department Legal Adviser concerning foreign policy prepared for Secretaries of
State) ("There can be no doubt that such legal advice ... fits exactly within the deliberative
process rationale for Exemption 5")petltion for cert.filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3711 (U.S. March 6, 1981)
(No. 80-1512); Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980) (in demonstrating that
the requested documents fit into internal agency processes, the agency must show that the re-
quested records "would not flow freely within the agency unless protected from public dis-
closure"); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(memoranda interpreting agency regulations from a regional counsel to field office auditors are
not exempt under the deliberative process privilege); Swisher v. Department of the Air Force, 495
F. Supp. 337 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (conclusions and recommendations in an Officer's Report of In-
quiry were held exempt); Cook County Legal Assistance Found. v. Office of Management &
Budget, No. 79-C-3292 (N.D. III. Jan. 4, 1980) (documents relating to the policies and establish-
ment of a Crisis Intervention Program were held exempt).
219. 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 25, § 15.02.
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tual-and predecisional--compiled in advance of a final decision or
disposition and not incorporated expressly or by reference into the final
agency document.220 The purpose of the privilege, which has its roots
in the doctrine of executive privilege,221 is to keep private the internal
deliberations of government agencies.222
The scope of the deliberative-process privilege was examined in
Taxation With Representation Fund v. IRS.223 The plaintiff, a non-
profit tax-news publisher, requested all General Counsel Memo-
randa,224 Technical Memoranda,225 and Actions on Decisions, 226 as
220. Seeid § 15.07. The duty to disclose a given document often depends on the finality of an
agency's action in view of the FOIA's prohibition of withholding final opinions or dispositions
and statements of policy. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 150-54; Brinton v.
Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Exemption 5 does not protect final
statements of policy or final actions of agencies, which have the force of law or which explain
actions the agency has already taken") petiion for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3711 (U.S. March 6,
1981) (No. 80-1512); Note, Developments Under FO14-1975, supra note 3, at 372-75.
The finality issue arises in other contexts as well. See Green v. Department of Commerce,
618 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (a district court order requiring notification of companies that their
previously submitted boycott reports would be disclosed and permitting the submitters to com-
ment was not an appealable final order until the court determined what information would actu-
ally be disclosed to a FOIA requester); Shermco Indus. v. Secretary of the Air Force, 613 F.2d
1314 (5th Cir. 1980) (government contract bidder's request for its competitor's pricing information
must be denied insofar as notice to unsuccessful bidders was not a final award of the contract
subject to automatic disclosure under section 552(a)(2)(A); furthermore the information was ex-
empt under Exemption 4); Swisher v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F. Supp. 337, 340 (W.D.
Mo. 1980) (an "allusion" to disputed documents in later documents does not constitute an "'ex-
press' adoption or incorporation") (emphasis in original).
221. 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 25, § 15.03.
222. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 150-54; Ryan v. Department of Justice,
617 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Exemption 5 "was created to protect the deliberative process
of the government, by ensuring that persons in an advisory role would be able to express their
opinions freely to agency decision-makers without fear of publicity"); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F.
Supp. 985, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1979) ("It]he principal purpose of Exemption 5 is the protection of the
common-law evidentiary privilege that attaches to predecisional, deliberative communications
within an agency") (citation omitted), appealpending, No. 80-1105 (6th Cir.).
223. 485 F. Supp. 263 (D.D.C. 1980), modfled, No. 78-2304 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1980) (portions
of memoranda falling under Exemption 3 and I.R.C. § 6103 were exempted from disclosure), af'd
inpart, mod/fled in part, and remanded, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,580 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
224. General Counsel Memoranda are responses by the Office of the Chief Counsel to re-
quests for legal advice concerning proposed private letter rulings, proposed technical advice mem-
oranda, and proposed revenue rulings of the IRS. 485 F. Supp. at 265-66.
225. Technical Memoranda provide background information, highlight legal or policy issues,
and describe the approach and rationales of the draftsman of a proposed rule for use in conjunc-
tion with the issuance of a Treasury Decision. Id at 267.
226. Actions on Decisions provide a summary of every case the IRS loses in the Tax Court or
in a district court with the preparer's recommendation for acquiescence or non-acquiescence in the
decision. Id at 266-67.
Vol. 1981:3381
DUKE L,4W JOURN4L [Vol. 1981:338
well as their related indices, 227 issued after July 4, 1967228 and in the
possession of the Internal Revenue Service. The Service argued that
the requested records were exempt from disclosure under the delibera-
tive-process privilege of Exemption 5. The Taxation court interpreted
the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. 229 as requiring disclosure when the requested records "contain the
reasons behind policy actually adopted." 230 Because the requested
records contained the reasons behind policies and positions adopted by
the Internal Revenue Service, the court held that they were not pro-
tected by Exemption 5.23 t In supplemental proceedings, the district
court modified its original decision by adding an alternative holding
that the requested memoranda and indices were subject to the affirma-
227. The service indexes each of the three types of memoranda for use in preparing future
documents, rulings, and IRS decisions, preparing for litigation, as well as to provide a mechanism
for consistent decision-making. Id at 266-67.
228. This date corresponds to th effective date of the 1967 amendments that gave the FOIA its
present structure. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
229. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). In Sears the Court held that "Advice" and "Appeal" memoranda
generated by the Office of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, explaining
the Board's decisions not to file unfair labor practice complaints, were final opinions not exempt
under the FOIA. Explaining that these documents reflect the agency's final disposition of the
disputes, the Court concluded that Exemption 5 could never apply to authorize a withholding of
"final opinions." Those memoranda describing a Director's decision recommending the filing of a
complaint were held not to be final opinions because they did not effect a final disposition of the
matter for which they were created. 421 U.S. at 150-60.
230. 485 F. Supp. at 265:
The [Sears] Court noted that "[c]rucial to the decision of this case is an understanding of
the function of the documents in issue in the context of the administrative process which
generated them.". . . [T]he public is. . . "vitally concerned with the reasons which did
supply the basis for an agency policy actually adopted .... "
Id For further discussion of Sears, see K. DAvIs, supra note 28, § 3A.21-2.
231. Although it cited no authority besides Sears for its decision, the court noted that its con-
clusions were supported by two recent district court decisions. It neglected, though, to note the
limited holdings of those cases. See Pies v. IRS, 484 F. Supp. 930 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that a
four-page Technical Memorandum discussing a proposed regulation was not exempt from FOIA
disclosure by means of Exemption 5 because, even though not formally enacted, the memoran-
dum and the proposed regulation had been incorporated into actual regulations and had been
used in rendering IRS opinions), appealpending, No. 79-2303 (D.C. Cir.); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F.
Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (a General Counsel Memorandum describing the aspects of a pro-
posed revenue ruling was ordered disclosed because it was a statement of policy adopted by the
Service), appealpending, No. 80-1105 (6th Cir.).
See also Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 869 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (memoranda interpreting Department of Energy regulations written by regional counsel for
the benefit of field office auditors are not exempt under any Exemption 5 privilege); Caspe v.
United States, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,312 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (two General Counsel Memoranda
relating to revenue rulings were ordered produced in light of Falcone v. IRS because they were
not deliberative), appealpending, No. 80-1604 (8th Cir.); Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 1979-1 Trade Cas.
77,906 (D.D.C. 1979) (staffmemoranda incorporated by reference into summary memoranda are
not exempt from discovery).
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tive disclosure provisions of section 552(a)(2) of the FOIA.232 In light
of this holding, the court also determined that the Service has "a 'con-
tinuing duty' to make the records and indices available. '2 33
After determining that Exemption 5 does not protect documents
reflective of adopted policies,234 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the plaintiff
was entitled to disclosure of all memoranda named in the request meet-
ing the adopted-policy standard.235 Instead of relying almost exclu-
sively on Sears, as had the district court,2 36 the court of appeals
considered cases from its own circuit as well as other decisions of the
Supreme Court.237 Although the requesters claimed disclosure under
both section 552(a)(2)2 38 and section 552(a)(3) 239 of the FOIA, the court
of appeals did not decide which section mandated disclosure; records
meeting the adopted-policy standard are apparently disclosable under
both sections.240
With respect to the application of the adopted-policy standard to
the requested memoranda, the two Taxation decisions differed signifi-
232. 485 F. Supp. 263 (D.D.C. 1980), modfed, No. 78-2304 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1980), a i'din
part, modfled inpart, and remanded, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 86,580: see id. at 86,588.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976) provides in part:
Each agency ... shall make available for public inspection and copying-(A) final opi-
nons ... made in the adjudication of cases; (B) those statements of policy and interpre-
tations which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal
Register, and (C) adminsitrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a mem-
ber of the public;, [and] ... indexes ....
233. See 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,588. In typical FOIA suits the agency is obligated to
disclose only nonexempt information that is already in existence. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S.
169, 182 (1980); 1 J. O'REILLY, supra note 25, §§ 5.03, 5.07. Under the affirmative disclosure
provisions of section 552(a)(2), however, prospective disclosure obligations can easily be implied.
234. 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,588-92.
235. See id. at 86,592-94.
236. See 485 F. Supp. at 265. The district court made no reference to decisions in the District
of Columbia Circuit prior to Sears that might have provided support for its adopted-policy stan-
dard. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 815, 817-18 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing de-
nied, 519 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704-10 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See note 231 supra. See also
Brinton v. Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (final statements of policy are
not protected by Exemption 5),petitionfor cert.filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3711 (U.S. March 6, 1981) (No.
80-1512).
237. See 81-I U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,588-92. The court of appeals quoted from the Sears
opinion but declined to place principal reliance on it, perhaps because the actual holding in Sears
did not require disclosure of adopted policies. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 5:35, at 407-09 (2d ed. 1978).
238. See note 232 supra.
239. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976): "[E]ach agency, upon any request for records . . . , shall
make the records promply available to any person!'
240. For a discussion of the interaction between affirmative disclosure under section 552(a)(2)
and request oriented disclosure under section 552(a)(3), see 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 237, § 5:4
(1978 & Supp. 1980).
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cantly. Relying on affidavits of various officials in the Office of the
Chief Counsel that described the Service's extensive use of the memo-
randa, the district court concluded that all the requested documents
explained or reflected adopted policy even though the court did not
specifically find that each memorandum satisfied this standard.24' In
contrast, the court of appeals reviewed the Service's affidavits and more
carefully scrutinized the functions and uses of the requested memo-
randa;242 the court implicitly recognized that a blanket application of
the adopted-policy standard would be inappropriate. Because the court
of appeals found that the three categories of memoranda named in the
request were actually representative of many different types of docu-
ments, it modified the district court's disclosure order to exclude those
types of memoranda that were not reflective of adopted policies. 243
The court held that some of the records were only in the predecisional
stages of agency promulgation and were thus shielded from disclosure
under Exemption 5.244 Similarly, the court found that certain Techni-
cal Memoranda relating to decisions and regulations that the Service
had never approved, and General Counsel Memoranda that had never
been distributed for use within the agency, could not be considered
"adopted policy" and were therefore exempt.245 In addition, the court
of appeals remanded for a determination of whether memoranda,
which recommended appeal of a decision adverse to the Service, re-
ceived the Assistant Commissioner's approval or contained informa-
tion concerning litigation strategy.246 The court believed that such
findings would be necessary to a conclusion that the documents contain
"adopted policy."2 47
The Taxation decisions required disclosure of agency memoranda
that reflect only adopted policies. Because application of this standard
to requested records is a factual matter,248 courts faced with requests
covering large numbers of ostensibly similar documents will most
241. See 485 F. Supp. at 264-67.
242. See 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,582-86, 86,592-94.
243. See id. at 86,592-94.
244. Id. at 86,592.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. See note 229 supra.
248. "We emphasize the particular nature of the [memoranda] here in issue because other
judicial opinions have suggested different variations .. " 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,592
n.22 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Cliff v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), in which the
court refused to allow the requester of an IRS memorandum to rely on the district court decision
in Taxation because the Taxation court's definition of a General Counsel Memorandum did not
include references to a proposed revenue procedure-the substance of the memorandum re-
quested in Ciff. Id. at 577.
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likely demand extensive evidence on the nature and function of docu-
ments from agencies claiming exemption under the deliberative-pro-
cess privilege.249
V. THE INVESTIGATORY RECORDS EXEMPTION
Exemption 7 of the FOIA250 permits agencies to withhold "investi-
gatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" if production
of the records would violate one or more of six additional criteria. Al-
though many courts considered issues under Exemption 7 in 1980,251
249. This procedure is analogous to the particularizations required by the Vaughn index that
is used in many FOIA cases. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 237, § 5:27, at 384.
250. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). The investigatory records exemption provides:
This section does not apply to matters that are. . . (7) investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records
would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a
fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investi-
gation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose
investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of
law enforcement personnel ....
Id See generally Ellsworth, Exemption 7 of the FOI.4: Law Enforcement Records, in LITIGATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY ACT 93 (5th ed. C.
Marwick ed. 1980).
251. See, e.g., Abramson v. FBI, I GOV'T DISCLOSURE SERV. (P-H) 80,266 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(in evaluating Exemption 7(C) claims, a court must determine that the disputed documents are
"investigatory record[s]" "compiled for law enforcement purposes" before considering whether
disclosure would invade personal privacy; when information is derived from existing documents
and "recompiled in a new document for a new purpose, the new document must qualify indepen-
dently for any" FOIA exemptions); Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Exemp-
tion 7(D) provides two separate exemptions, one for the identity of a confidential source and one
for information furnished by a confidential source regardless of whether the information contains
the informant's identity); Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1980) (local law enforcement
agencies constitute confidential sources under Exemption 7(D)); Lesar v. Department of Justice,
636 F.2d 472,479,487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (state and local law enforcement agencies are confiden-
tial sources) (the names of FBI agents may be exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(C) in
some circumstances; there is no blanket exemption for all agents' names); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620
F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980) (information derived from illegal domestic surveillance can still be "com-
piled for law enforcement purposes"); Church of Scientology v. Department of Justice, 612 F.2d
417 (9th Cir. 1979) (foreign, state, and local law enforcement agencies constitute confidential
sources under Exemption 7(D)); Copus v. Rougeau, 504 F. Supp. 534, 538-39 (D.D.C. 1980)
(quarterly compliance review forecasts created by the Department of Labor's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs describing and recommending review of certain contractors' dis-
criminatory practices are shielded from disclosure by Exemption 7(A)); Radowich v. United States
Attorney, 501 F. Supp. 284 (D. Md. 1980) (an unjustified promise of confidentiality precludes use
of Exemption 7(D)); Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1980) (that docu-
ments are provided by law enforcement agencies is insufficient, by itself, to infer that the required
promise of confidentiality was made); Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 494 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(unsolicited complaint letters received by the Federal Trade Commission before an investigation
may become investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes once the letters are
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the most significant development concerned Exemption 7(A),252 which
exempts investigatory records if disclosure would "interfere with en-
forcement proceedings." In Moorefeld v. United States Secret Serv-
ice253 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered a FOIA
request by Moorefield, who, after being convicted for two attempts to
assassinate the President, requested all documents in the fie the Secret
Service maintained on him. The Service denied the request, claiming
the entire file was subject to Exemption 7, without specifying how the
exemption applied to particular documents. Moorefield argued that
Exemption 7(A) did not apply. He contended that he was no longer
suspected of criminal activity and that the Secret Service's ongoing in-
terest in him as a potential threat did not amount to "enforcement pro-
ceedings" within the meaning of the exemption. In Moorefield's view
enforcement proceedings were limited to judicial proceedings; no inter-
ference with enforcement proceedings occurred because the Service
contemplated no judicial action against him.25 4
Judge Tjoflat, writing for the court, rejected this theory, holding
that the Secret Service's activities in investigating potential criminals
constitute enforcement proceedings under Exemption 7(A).255 Ac-
knowledging that in most circumstances it is "reasonable to equate 'en-
forcement proceeding' with an adjudicatory procedure, ' 256 Judge
Tjoflat concluded that the Secret Service's investigation constituted an
exception to this generalization. Secret Service investigations are un-
dertaken to prevent attacks against persons the Service is protecting, in
contrast to typical law enforcement investigations, which are conducted
to apprehend and prosecute law-breakers. 257 Both types of investiga-
tions, however, are "directed toward an active and concrete effort to
enforce the law"; both, therefore, are properly designated "enforcement
proceedings. '258
compiled into an active investigation file); Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1138, 1142-43 (D.D.C.
1980) (release of ABSCAM tapes to the public through unauthorized leaks does not preclude a
finding that redisclosure would interfere with enforcement proceedings); OKC Corp. v. Williams,
489 F. Supp. 576, 584 (N.D. Tex. 1980) ("it cannot be said as a matter of law that disclosure of all
types of material in investigatory files would necessarily interfere with all types of enforcement
proceeding[s]"; the court must examine the "type of material sought and the type of enforcement
proceeding.. . contemplated" to determine whether interference would occur).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976), set out in note 250 supra.
253. 611 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 283 (1980).
254. 611 F.2d at 1024.
255. Id at 1026.
256. Id at 1024.
257. Id at 1025.
258. Id The court looked to the views of Senator Hart, who introduced the 1974 exemption
amendment, and concluded that "'enforcement proceedings' correspond with 'law enforcement
purposes,' and such purposes include the prevention as well as the detection and punishment of
[Vol. 1981:338
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Finding that disclosure of the investigatory file would interfere
with the enforcement proceedings, the court exempted the entire file
from disclosure.259 The court noted that ordinarily an agency must
specify why each document in a withheld file falls within a FOIA ex-
emption.260 But, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. ,261 Judge Tjoflat concluded that Exemption
7(A) permits generic determinations that entire fies should be with-
held.262
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Moorefteld, with Justices
White and Brennan dissenting.2 63 Justice White questioned the deci-
sion of the court of appeals with respect to both its expansive reading of
"enforcement proceedings" and its determination that the entire file
was exempt.2 64 Pointing out that other law enforcement agencies en-
gage in prophylactic investigations, Justice White explained that after
Moor§elid "arguably many investigatory files of other law enforce-
ment agencies also qualify for exemption. ' 265 In addition, Justice
White asserted that Robbins Tire permits a generic determination of
exemption only for particular types of documents, not for entire inves-
tigatory files.266
violations of the law." Id; see 120 CONG. REc. 17033 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart, which may be
given less weight than the court gave them). As support for its conclusion, the court relied heavily
on NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978), in which the Supreme Court
upheld under Exemption 7(A) the withholding of potential witnesses' statements in an NLRB
investigation. See generally Note, Developments Under FOIA-1978, supra note 3, at 339-43. Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in Robbins Tire, Congress enacted Ex-
emption 7(A) in 1974 to overrule judicial decisions prohibiting disclosure in "closed" cases. 611
F.2d at 1024; see 437 U.S. at 226-29. But, explained Judge Tjoflat, "[t]he Court in Robbins Tire
found that when Congress enacted the 1974 amendments, it did not wish to alter or undercut the
existing FOIA exemptions .... " 611 F.2d at 1025; see 437 U.S. at 233-34. Because Congress
"clearly" intended, under the original FOIA, to exempt open Secret Service fies, Judge Tjoflat
concluded that Exemption 7(A) should shield the file at issue. 611 F.2d at 1025-26.
259. 611 F.2d at 1026.
260. Id at 1023.
261. 437 U.S. 214 (1978). In Robbins Tire the Court stated that "generic determinations" that
records in investigatory fies fall within Exemption 7(A) are permissible: "Ve conclude that Con-
gress did not intend to prevent the federal courts from determining that, with respect to particular
kinds of enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory records while a
case is pending would generally 'interfere with enforcement proceedings."' Id at 236.
262. 611 F.2d at 1024, 1026.
263. 101 S. Ct. 283 (1980).
264. Id at 284-85 (White, J., dissenting).
265. Id at 285.
266. Id An investigatory file may include different types of documents. A generic determina-
tion with respect to an entire file thus seemed to Justice White inconsistent with Robbins Tire, in
which the Supreme Court stated:
[B]y substituting the word 'records' for 'fies,' [the Amendment] would make clear that
courts had to consider the nature of the particular document as to which exemption was
claimed, in order to avoid the possibility of impermissible 'commingling' by an agency's
DUKE L4WJOURV4L
VI. CONCLUSION
As in prior years, judicial developments under the FOIA in 1980
were largely unsuccessful in resolving the problem areas underlying the
litigation. The Supreme Court in Kissinger, Forsham, and Consumers
Union considered all three of the threshold requirements for a suit
under the FOIA without giving any manageable standards for future
cases. The Court's restrictive interpretations of these criteria may
shield certain records and quasi-agencies that appeared to fall within
the Act. Some disputes fundamental to document classification under
the national security exemption were resolved in ways that may further
restrict disclosures. The GTE Sylvania Court's resolution of a conflict
over the applicability of the Consumer Product Safety Act to FOIA
requests, which resolution favored information submitters, and the en-
actment of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act may sig-
nal increased protection of business and confidential information at the
expense of FOIA requesters. Similarly, the blanket disclosure exemp-
tion now accorded the Federal Trade Commission and the Secret Serv-
ice for investigation files indicates at least a partial reversal in the full-
disclosure purpose of the FOIA. In 1980 the evolution of FOIA law
continued, displaying a clear trend toward restricting the availability of
disclosure.
James R. Peacock III
placing in an investigatory file material that did not legitimately have to be kept confi-
dential.
437 U.S. at 229-30, quotedin 101 S. Ct. at 285 (White, J., dissenting).
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